A cursory reading of the decision (PDF), and most reporting on it do suggest that it allows the president to sell pardons. Clarity that it does not can be found in a footnote, which reads in part:
JUSTICE BARRETT disagrees, arguing that in a bribery prosecution, for instance, excluding “any mention” of the official act associated with the
bribe “would hamstring the prosecution.” … But of course the prosecutor may point to the public record to show the fact that the President performed the official act. And the prosecutor may admit evidence of what the President allegedly demanded, received, accepted, or agreed to receive or accept in return for being influenced in the performance of the act… What the prosecutor may not do,however, is admit testimony or private records of the President or his advisers probing the official act itself.
This is presumably in reference to a past president, who would not have those powers. The legal issues surrounding prosecuting a sitting president have not been explored, and this ruling does not address them directly as they were not relevant to the case.
The risk of something like that happening is not closely connected to anything in the ruling we’re discussing here. If a president manages to hold on to power after losing an election or reaching a term limit, the situation has devolved far beyond ordinary criminal prosecution; the constitution is no longer being enforced at that point.
I have a different take and I think the Chief Justice is being intentionally vague here. He references a bribery prosecution but never specifically mentions in the footnote whether he is referring to the issuance of a pardon, which is a core function, and thus entitled to absolute immunity based on the rest of the opinion. It’s also not clear whether he is referring to a prosecution of the briber or the person being bribed.
Reading Justice Barrett’s partial concurrence, which is what the footnote responds to and also included in the linked ruling addresses your concern. Justice Barrett is unambiguously talking about prosecuting the president for accepting a bribe.
Except a pardon is a core function within the president’s constitutional authority, not just an official act, thus based on the opinion entitled to absolute immunity. The footnote exchange is only referencing official acts (which are entitled to presumptive immunity) not core constitutional functions (like a pardon).
A cursory reading of the decision (PDF), and most reporting on it do suggest that it allows the president to sell pardons. Clarity that it does not can be found in a footnote, which reads in part:
Who’s going to prosecute him? He can just imprison or fire anyone who tries.
This is presumably in reference to a past president, who would not have those powers. The legal issues surrounding prosecuting a sitting president have not been explored, and this ruling does not address them directly as they were not relevant to the case.
But Trump won’t be a past president because he won’t leave office until he’s dead. He’ll never be prosecuted, and he knows it.
The risk of something like that happening is not closely connected to anything in the ruling we’re discussing here. If a president manages to hold on to power after losing an election or reaching a term limit, the situation has devolved far beyond ordinary criminal prosecution; the constitution is no longer being enforced at that point.
This ruling is what gives him the immunity to prevent enforcement of the constitution.
Have you read the ruling?
I have a different take and I think the Chief Justice is being intentionally vague here. He references a bribery prosecution but never specifically mentions in the footnote whether he is referring to the issuance of a pardon, which is a core function, and thus entitled to absolute immunity based on the rest of the opinion. It’s also not clear whether he is referring to a prosecution of the briber or the person being bribed.
Reading Justice Barrett’s partial concurrence, which is what the footnote responds to and also included in the linked ruling addresses your concern. Justice Barrett is unambiguously talking about prosecuting the president for accepting a bribe.
Except a pardon is a core function within the president’s constitutional authority, not just an official act, thus based on the opinion entitled to absolute immunity. The footnote exchange is only referencing official acts (which are entitled to presumptive immunity) not core constitutional functions (like a pardon).
Accepting a bribe is, however not an official act. It’s the acceptance of the bribe that’s illegal, not the official act itself.