A woman in Attleboro takes an at-home test and finds out she’s pregnant. She looks up nearby reproductive health clinics and finds one: Four Women Health Services, which has also been providing abortions for decades. She sends a request through an online chat on Four Women’s website to set up an ultrasound appointment.
Less than half an hour later, she receives a call to schedule an appointment and books one.
But the person who just called her doesn’t work for Four Women. They called to book her an appointment at the center across the street: Attleboro Women’s Health Center, or Abundant Hope.
That’s what allegedly happened last October. Four Women is now suing in federal court, alleging that at least four potential patients apparently had their messages intercepted by Attleboro Women’s Health Center — an entity that is not a licensed health care facility and does not provide abortions.
In IT systems that I’ve been a part of that manage HIPAA data, there are access controls and audit trails required for compliance. The fact that the victims are receiving calls within mere hours of posting the request should make a very short audit trail. What will turn up is either the perpetrator’s user account, or possibly a non-related worker that had compromised account credentials (username/password). Even then it will show access from a specific IP address, and that IP address can be audited back to which piece of hardware (desktop, laptop, tablet) had that IP address at that time. From that point there are cameras and timeclock tracking.
Since this has happened more than once, it is unlikely the exact same staff has been working at the same time for all the recorded incidents of leaks. Its a process of elimination problem at that point. Example using fake names of workers:
Leak 1 workers:
Leak 2 workers:
Leak 3 workers:
Leak 4 workers:
The leaker is Dennis as he is the only worker that was there on all 4 shifts when the request came in.